Chapter 13 - Sentencing
Harold was sixty-three.
No prior criminal record.
Long business history.
Community donations.
Employees wrote letters.
So did Andrew’s childhood friends.
Some said:
“He was a good father.”
I believed them.
He could be.
Then the prosecution showed what good-history arguments could not erase.
A three-year-old.
A belt.
A concussion-producing flight.
Deletion.
Eleven minutes.
Judge separated.
The fall caused the concussion.
The belt prompted the flight.
Could Harold be criminally responsible for every consequence?
The jury had found enough under child-endangerment theory.
Sentencing considered.
Margaret’s role less direct.
Her sentence should differ.
Victim statements.
Mine:
“Camila still asks whether saying no makes adults angry.”
That was all I needed.
Then:
“Please do not sentence Harold for being a bad grandfather. Sentence him for the crimes the jury found.”
Dana helped me remove half the anger.
Good.
Margaret heard her sentence first.
Short local custodial term, mostly suspended? Let's make 90 days with 60 suspended, probation, counseling, no contact absent court. Because tampering serious and failure protect. Harold more.
Margaret:
Ninety days county custody with sixty suspended subject to compliance.
Two years probation.
No contact with Camila except future family-court authorization.
Evidence-integrity counseling? Not a thing. General behavioral therapy.
Restitution for certain prosecution/camera costs? Video belonged her, no. Medical not direct? Could be joint civil later.
Harold:
Eighteen months incarceration with portion suspended? Let's say 18 months, eligible release after defined local/state credits, plus probation. Given felony child abuse. Not extreme.
Restitution for Camila’s uncovered medical costs.
No contact.
Parenting/violence intervention.
No fiduciary or advisory role involving Camila during supervision.
That last condition required legal fit; the trust company independently suspended Harold’s family-adviser role due conflict and conviction, not criminal judge dictating trust. Better separate.
At sentencing, Harold said:
“I loved my granddaughter.”
Judge:
“The state did not prove otherwise.”
Then:
“I believed I was disciplining her.”
Judge:
“That belief is part of why supervision and treatment are necessary.”
Good.
Margaret said:
“I should have stopped him.”
No excuse.
Then First Harbor removed Harold as designated family adviser under trust’s incapacity/conflict clause? Could it? Let's say trust instrument allowed replacement for felony involving beneficiary or demonstrated conflict, after independent review. Court approved appointment of independent family-business adviser, not Lucía.
New adviser:
David Sterling, Andrew’s cousin? Could have conflict. Better independent corporate fiduciary consultant.
This angered Harold.
But his economic rights in Sterling Ridge remained.
He was still CEO of parent company?
Board placed him on leave during conviction.
Shareholders later voted.
Not automatic.
He owned 27%.
Could not be stripped.
Then Sterling Ridge board appointed interim CEO.
Company kept running.
Employees not punished.
Riverside continued.
Active corporate battle remained.
Harold appealed conviction.
Margaret appealed tampering count.
No closure yet.
Then I filed civil claims for Camila.
Not millions.
Medical costs.
Therapy.
Pain and suffering.
Potential punitive damages depending conduct.
Insurance coverage disputed because intentional acts exclusions.
Harold had assets.
Civil process would be ugly.
Dana asked:
“Why sue?”
“Because criminal restitution doesn’t cover all harm.”
“Good.”
Not revenge answer.
Then Margaret’s lawyer offered civil settlement if I would support future supervised visitation.
No.
Immediately.
“Contact is not currency.”
May you like
Offer withdrawn.
That mistake would appear in family court later.
