Chapter 14 - The printer metadata
People imagine document fraud is solved by handwriting experts.
Sometimes.
In our case, printers were more useful.
Investigators recovered a PDF copy of the forged deed from Derek’s laptop.
Created eleven minutes before e-record submission.
Author metadata:
Derek Mercer.
Not definitive by itself.
Programs assign user names automatically.
Then they found earlier versions.
One draft had blank signature lines.
Another contained my signature image inserted but Elaine’s line blank.
Another contained both.
A graphics program cache held clipped signature images from:
My 2023 boat affidavit.
Elaine’s 2018 living-will acknowledgment.
Paige Larkin’s notary signature from the boat document.
That was devastating.
Derek’s defense suggested another person had access to his laptop.
Possible.
Then office security video showed Derek alone in his office during the creation period.
Not every second.
Enough.
The e-recording account used belonged to a small closing-services vendor Shane had used on a prior legitimate transaction.
How did Derek access it?
Saved credentials on a shared office computer.
That created a separate security failure.
The vendor cooperated.
No evidence its employee knowingly helped fraud.
Again:
May you like
No giant ring.
One desperate man exploiting convenient digital leftovers.
